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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 19-2838
________________
PHILIP TIENE,
Appellant
v.

DREXEL UNIVERSITY; J. SCOTT WATSON, P.C.
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2-17-cv-02683)
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 18, 2020
Before: McKEE, BIBAS and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 21, 2020)
___________
OPINION
___________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Philip Tiene briefly attended Drexel University, accruing $10,596.35 in
unpaid tuition and fees.1 The University obtained a default judgment against him for this
amount. Tiene responded by suing the school and its law firm for alleged violations of
federal and state debt collection laws.2 The district court granted summary judgment to
both defendants, and Tiene now appeals the judgment in favor of the law firm under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Because we agree that Tiene’s allegations fail to
present an issue of contested material fact, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.3
I.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party.4 We are not charged, or permitted, to secondguess credibility determinations or to weigh evidence.5
The crux of Tiene’s case is that J. Scott Watson, P.C. (JSW) violated the FDCPA
by relying on the incorrect residential address from Drexel’s Banner system. However, he
can point to no evidence that JSW was aware that this address was inaccurate.6
Furthermore, even if JSW had intentionally provided the wrong address, Tiene would
have to look beyond the FDCPA for a remedy. We have held, “a false statement is only
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Tiene v. L. Off. of J Scott Watson PC, 755 Fed. App’x. 203, 204 (3d Cir. 2018).
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and the Pennsylvania
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. § 201-1 et seq.
3
The district court held subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We hold
jurisdiction over this subsequent appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 255 (1986).
5
Id.
6
App. 172-74.
2
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actionable under the FDCPA if it has the potential to affect the decision-making process
of the least sophisticated debtor; in other words, it must be material when viewed through
the least sophisticated debtor’s eyes.”7 As the district court rightly concluded, because the
incorrect address prevented Tiene from receiving notice of the suit, it could not have
affected his decision-making and therefore is not actionable under the FDCPA.8
Tiene also claims that the notices mailed by JSW violate the FDCPA because they
did not include the correct case name (listing it as “Drexel University Tuition” rather than
“Drexel University”), and failed to include the court’s division number, making it
marginally harder to locate online.9 He points to our well-established “least sophisticated
debtor” standard.10 The standard “[i]s an objective one, meaning that the specific plaintiff
need not prove that she was actually confused or misled, only that the objective least
sophisticated debtor would be.”11 But Tiene concedes he gave up after being unable to
locate the case information through a simple Google search.12 The district court correctly

7

Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 2015).
Of course, a suit that falls outside the ambit of the FDCPA may be actionable on other
grounds, but Tiene’s claim expires here. He relies for his federal claims solely on
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as the district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
9
15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
10
791 F.3d at 418.
11
Id. at 419 (emphasis in original).
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The district court dismissed Tiene’s reliance on Google as “patently absurd.” Tiene v.
Drexel Univ., CV 17-2683, 2019 WL 3037182, at *7 n.8 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2019).
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notes that had he even searched for his own name on the municipal court’s website, he
could have readily located the case information.13
Finally, Tiene alleged that JSW violated the FDCPA by opposing in court his
effort to contest the default judgment. The district court carefully reviewed the
proceedings giving rise to this claim and found them to be unsupported by that record.
We agree. JSW’s legal efforts were directed at defending against Tiene’s fraud
allegations, not at enforcing the default judgment itself.14 Thus, there are no disputed
material facts in the record, and JSW is properly entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
II.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.

See Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (Explaining the “least
sophisticated debtor” is “a low standard,” but that it still “presum[es] a basic level of
understanding and willingness to read with care.”) (quotation omitted).
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App. 18-20, 456-57.
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